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NATURE OF THE PETITION 
The above court filed its decision on June 4, 1976. Pursuant to rule 
76(e) and within the time allowed, formal petition for rehearing has been 
filed with this court. The points relied upon there are the same as appear-
ing in this brief. The appellant prays this court to entertain its petition 
for rehearing, and to reverse the trial court with a new opinion that re-
flects the case law apposite. 
POINTS OF ERROR 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF OR THE BURDEN 
OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE ON APPELLANT. 
The bottom three lines of the first page of the decision state: 
"It seems that the appellant did not need an interpretation of 
a contract. What he actually wanted the court to do was to 
determine which of the copies of the contract correctly re-
flected the true agreement of the parties." 
Said language incorrectly characterizes the pleadings and the record. At 
no time did appellant ask a court to determine "which" contract reflected 
the agreement. It pleaded the escrow instrument. Paragraph III on page 3 
of the instrument made the escrow instrument the sole source of authority; 
all documents not escrowed are thus immaterial. Respondents admitted said 
instrument of execution, verification and escrowing. It then pleaded an 
affirmative defense of alteration, not stating the fraud to be before or 
after execution. 
In approaching the question, reference had better be made to Exhibit 
10 which was an affirmative act of the Youngs, declaring a default on a 
contract on which Hartman had already paid near $80,000.00- Also the 
court would want to consider who, in the situation at bar, was the "prime 
mover". The action of plaintiff Hartman was "defensive", if attention is 
given to the prime authority cited at the bottom of page 276 of vol. 9, 
Utah Code Anno. 1953 under a text of "Burden of proof in action under de-
claratory judgment acts, 109 ALR 1099." 
The court says above "the appellant did not need an interpretation 
of a contract." What did appellant need? In truth the opinion is wrong 
in saying Hartman wanted the court to determine which of the copies of 
the contract correctly reflected the true agreement of the parties. The 
complaint refers but to the escrow copy, asking the court to "instruct all 
parties in the premises." 
It was the Youngs who introduced the concept of another copy of the 
contract, this as an affirmative defense. The consequence of this pleading 
was never understood nor conjured with by the trial court nor the appeal 
court. A proper understanding thereof would produce a different result 
in the case. A failure to grasp the import of such affirmative defense 
altered the burden of proof. 
This court has incorrectly stated the law in writing: 
"If he (Hartman) relies upon the declaratory judgment 
statute he certainly has the burden of convincing 
the trial court that his claim to relief is as he 
claimed it to be." 
In the first place, Hartman alleged the escrow copy. The Youngs 
admitted they executed same and that it was the escrow copy. Then they 
became the true actors in asserting the wrongful alteration of the es-
crow document, just as they had been the prime movers in sending the de-
fault notice. 
In the second place, the honorable court is wrong and outside the case 
law in placing the burden of proof on plaintiff Hartman. The decision 
herein is bottomed on the finding above quoted which puts the burden on 
appellant Hartman. As written, the distinction between prime burden of 
proof, and going forward with the evidence, after a prima facie case has 
been made, is unimportant. We are well aware of the difference. The 
court's writing may be ambiguous, but it's import is clear here, and is 
not musunderstood by appellant, nor will it be to the editors who print 
and comment. The indexes in the law books will cite the instant decision 
for the proposition that the Utah high court places the burden of proof 
on the person bringing a declaratory judgment action. The court cites no 
case law. There is an abundance of case law to the contrary. Had the 
court adverted to the said case law, the decision would have noted the 
vast majority of courts in the nation take a different view, and the de-
cision would articulate the determination of this court to disagree. 
We thank the court for its kind words in the final paragraph of our 
unfortunate decision: 
"Apparently he (Hartman) made a prima facie showing suf-
ficient in accordance with the statute to admit the 
document ..." 
The court decision fails to note as a concomitant to the above finding 
that the trial court denied the Young's motion to dismiss or for non-suit 
at the conclusion of plaintiff's case. (Tr 122) By this court's allowing 
that plaintiff met the burden of the statute quoted (78-25-17 UCA) the 
case law of the highest authority places the burden of going forward with 
the evidence on the "prime mover", the actor, the party pleading and under-
taking to establish an affirmative defense. This means the respondents 
had the burden, once the prima facie case was made by appellant. 
The prime authority leading to an understanding of the case law for 
measuring the case at bar is that cited at said volume 9 at page 276 at 
the bottomyof the Utah statute. The annotation of 109 ALR 1099 follows 
the leading case of TRAVELERS' INSURANCE v 6REEN0U6H, 190 A. 129, 109 
ALR 1096, 1937. If this court desires to disagree with said case, may it 
say so. The thrust of Greenough is that the mere bringing of the declara-
tory judgment action does not determine burden of proof. It discusses 
"preliminary issues," which should be disposed of ahead of a principal 
action, stating the declaratory judgment procedure to be admirable. It 
talks about a plaintiff that in truth has been put on the "defensive" in 
a demand by the insured to defend a negligence suit. If the driver of 
the insured car had been a trespasser or someone for whom consent had not 
been given, the insurred owed no duty to defend. The New Hampshire court 
wrote that to place the burden of proof on the "defensive" plaintiff who 
filed the declarative petition for the "preliminary" determination of an 
ambiguous situation, was reversible error. 
The sending of Exhibit 10 by the Youngs to plaintiff Hartman put the 
plaintiff "on the defensive" just as the demand to defend the insurance-
negligence case did the insurrer. 
Now please advert to the three final lines on the first page of the 
instant decision of this court: their ring is hollow, shallow. In no 
way do they put the compass on plaintiff's dilemma, after receiving Ex-
hibit 10. Plaintiff had three alternatives: 1) pay the Youngs the $4171.00 
so demanded/ 2) do nothing, and let the 60-day notice run; then run the 
risks stated in the default clauses of the contract which among other 
things embraced a retaking of the farm without legal action; 3) follow 
the procedure outlined by the New Hampshire court as an act of good faith, 
preliminarily taking the heat off by depositing the fund in court. 
Paragraph III on page 3 of the contract told the plaintiff to check 
the escrow document at the bank. Thereby the other two copies, exhibits 
2 and 3 are irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent. Now plaintiff and his 
counsel go to the bank. The articulation in the opinion that "The escrow 
agent allowed the appellant to take his copy of the contract" is unworthy. 
(There is not the slightest hint in the evidence that the document was 
touched at any time after execution and acknowledgment except by authorized 
bank personnel !) 
In terms of the disposition of this case at the trial and appeal level, 
the plaintiff would have done better to take the risks of number two above. 
The consideration of doing nothing, but waiting for the Youngs to actually 
effect the default procedures, will point up the error in the decision: 
Had Hartman done nothing, the Youngs would have acted either by moving 
back onto the farm (with guns), or entering suit for eviction, unlawful 
detainer or the like. Had such been done, then who would this court find 
had the burden of proof? On a correct answer to this question hangs the 
proper disposal of the case at bar. There can be no question; it would 
have fallen on the Youngs. This question of law is clearly discussed in 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE v GREENOUGH, 190 A 129, 109 ALR 196 (cited at pages 
22, 25, 27 of our main brief) where the appeal court stated: 
"Whatever the form of the proceeding and notwithstanding 
its nominal position as a plaintiff, the real situation 
is that it is defending against a claim of its liability. 
The relief it seeks is primarily to have the claim ad-
judicated. Its position that the claim is without merit 
is necessary, in order to show the claim is a contro-
verted one. By instituting the litigation it compels 
the claimant to take action in assertion of his claim. 
He (the insured claimant) is required to establish it 
to entitle it to valadity...the claim is defeated if it 
is not proved, and it is for the claimant to furnish 
the proof." (emphasis added) 
The New Hampshire court stated that to hold a contrary view "would place 
the plaintiff in a position of undue disadvantage." Appellant in the case 
at bar has been placed by this court, as well as the trial court, in the 
same disadvantaged position. The naked statement in the opinion of this 
court that the burden was on appellant is wrong, contrary to the case law 
of the country. Said Travelers v. Greenough has become the law of the land! 
The next strong burden of proof case under declaratory judgment 
procedure, in discussing the issue,is PREFERRED ACCIDENT INS. v. GRASSO, 
186 F2d 987; 23 ALR 2d 1234, cited and discussed at page 24 of our original 
brief. The 2nd CCA case is there fully discussed. Sufficient to quote here: 
"Does the fact that this is the insurer's action for a 
declaratory judgment change the principle? It would 
seem rather anamalous that so important a matter 
should depend on the chance of who first sues and the 
outstanding authority in the field argues against 
such a result. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments..." 
where that familiar authority argues "that the burden of proof in de-
claratory judgment actions rests, in the vast majority of cases, on 
the moving party." He assigns this burden to "the insured or injured 
person." The 2nd CCA held the burden was not on the plaintiff insurance 
carrier, but on the insured and the injured party. Two important cases 
are cited as authority for the decision: Travelers Ins. v Greenough, 
supra, and RELIANCE LIFE v BURGESS, 8 Cir 112 F2d 234, certiorari denied 
311 US 699 etc. (cited at pages 25, and two other places in our original 
brief. Borchard has been quoted at length by this court in GRAY v DEFA 
153 P2d 544 and elsewhere. 
Following said Grasso case is a 34 page annotation under the heading: 
"BURDEN OF PROOF IN ACTIONS UNDER GENERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTS," 
There is no evidence in the text of the decision at bar that the court 
adverted to said annotation, nor that appearing after the above Greenough 
citation. It is doubtful this court has plumbed the law stated in the 
second paragraph on page two of its decision. The cases are so well 
analyzed in the said annotation, we will not elaborate. Many cases cited 
therein are cited in our brief. At page 1252 of the annotation it is 
stated: 
"There is no one principle or set of principles that 
governs the incidence of burden of proof in all cases. 
It is merely a question of policy and fairness based on 
experience in the different situations." 
The Utah court has adopted a "policy" as stated at line 8 of page 2 of 
its decision which is not elaborated in terms familiar to its own decisions 
and those of other states. The decision lacks fairness. It is a denial 
of constitutional due process of law. There is no Utah authority stating 
the rule announced in the case at bar. The court should be impressed with 
the vast cerebration employed on the subject around the nation and not 
reflected in its decision. Appellant tried to find the law of the case. 
Unfortunately it cited 46 cases, all in point, only to find the court 
cited not one. It will be found appellant disclosed pertinent case law 
to the many problems incident to the case at bar. We desire not to 
repeat. 
It is disheartening to cite cases when the writer has a conviction 
they are not read, adverted to. Our neighboring court wrote in FIRST 
NATL. BANK v FORD, Wyo , 216 P 691, 31 ALR 1441 
"The burden of proof is upon the party asserting the 
affirmative of an issue." 
This was an alteration case where the bank offered a note for $450 for 
collection which the defendant admitted signing, but for only $150, the 
instrument being raised by an unlawful alteration. While the change was 
not obvious on its face, the law is ably discussed. Appellant is lost 
when the courlB ignore its attempt to find the case law. The above case 
is one of the better discussions on the subject of alteration, burden of 
, proof. 
The court said the factual issues were in conflict. Burden of proof 
is one of the sole means of the court in dealing with such conflicts, so 
held in PREFERRED ACCIDENT INS. CO. v GRASSO, supra in the following: 
"As the first district judge found the evidence con-
flicting and unsatisfactory and finally settled it 
through the medium of the burden of proof ..." 
A lawful assessment of such burden would and will produce a different re-
sult in this case, and bring justice and rationality out into the light. 
Appellant has never been so fortunate as to have the court say NORTH-
CREST v WALKER BANK 122 U 268, 248 P2d 692 was important to the disposition 
of this case. The trial and appeal courts have ignored its citation. It 
is believed Exhibit 1, the escrow document as it lay in the bank, was of 
equal stature to a recorded deed or contract. Northcrest and its peers 
stand for a sound doctrine of he who assails a regularly verified document 
must do so with clear and convincing evidence. The wrong here is that 
the assailant had no evidence; and by the application of the false im-
position of burden of proof was able to prevail only on the basis of 
inference, inuendo, and the seemy theory that as the document in escrow 
was taken from the vault two times by the escrow officer, there might 
have been a chance for the forgery by appellant. Northcrest is good law. 
It should have been applied to the case at bar. There is still time to 
employ Northcrest. When its splendid doctrine is brought to bear the un-
fair inferences will take their low place, exposed for what they are. 
The instant decision states: "If he relies upon the declaratory 
judgment statute, he certainly has the burden of convincing the trial 
court that his claim to relief is as he claims it to be." A careful study 
of the complaint and answer will show that everything appellant claimed -
was admitted by respondents. Plaintiff "claimed" Exhibit 1 was duly 
executed, verified and filed in the escrow. Plaintiff "claimed" nothing 
for any other document, for under paragraph III on page 3 all other docu-
ments outside the escrow are immaterial. How the court could be so sure 
of its burden-of-proof conclusion as to use the underlined "certainly" 
is ambiguous to say the least. It is not the law. The case will be over-
ruled by some subsequent court. 
In the final paragraph of the decison the court concludes the trier, 
by admitting the escrow document is not required to "accept the document 
as genuine." By overruling defendants' motion for nonsuit, and by this 
court's finding a prima facie case was made by plaintiff, the escrow docu-
ment must stand; let he who assails now prove the fraud, the forgery it 
claimed. In the face of the disputed evidence, and in terms of the 
great weight of authority that the burden is on the party asserting the 
wrong or unlawful alteration or any fundamental affirmative defense, 
this court should hold the Youngs must prove their claim with clear and 
convincing evidence. Plaintiff was put in an impossible position at the 
outset. This court has compounded a grave injustice, and this without 
evidence, and against the great weight of law. 
The trial court erred initially in putting the burden on plaintiff. 
Thus plaintiff had to go forward. Under 78-25-17 and good case law, it 
was plaintiff's duty to "explain" and "account for" the alteration com-
plained of. Of necessity exhibits 2 and 3 came to the court; but when 
the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, at the conclusion of 
plaintiff's prima facie case, the dignity of exhibits 2 and 3 lowered, 
according to the text of page III, paragraph 3. 
The escrow document being sufficiently explained, took to the high 
ground of a verified, recorded conveyance. The California court in ROAD-
SIDE REST v LANKERSHIM 173 P2d 554 is not easy to sweep under the rug. 
It will enlighten if light is desired, along with a dozen other strong 
cases cited in our original brief. This court should rehear and alter 
its decision. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CREATING ITS OWN CONTRACT, AND DISREGARDING 
THE CONTRACT AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, AND ESCROWED. 
The opinion as wri t ten violates this court's rul ing in such cases 
as EPHRAIM THEATRE v HAWK, 321 P2d 221. The effect of the lower court's 
decision, affirmed here, makes a new and different contract than the parties 
agreed to at the bank. Why is there no reference to paragraph III of page 
3 wherein the bank is to hold "all documents appurtenant to or used in con-
nection with this agreement..."? The decision turns on and validates 
Exhibit 3, not Exhibit 1. The decision says the three exhibits are ident-
ical except for the contested change at line 21 at page 2. This is not 
true. Let this court state which exhibit is controlling. The water stock 
certificate numbers are complete on Exhibit 1. They are totally absent in 
Exhibit 3. The land without the water is useless! On page 3 blanks were 
left open relating to buyer paying assessments after a date to befilledin. 
Exhibit 1 was filled in 14 lines from the top. Exhibit 3 is as blank as 
the day it was typed. 
The court has violated its own rules, as quoted at page 48 of the 
original brief in EPHRAIM THEATRE v HAWK, 321 P2d 221. Since when does 
this court modify firm agreements to suit their own whim? Has this court 
abandoned its time-honored holding in MOODY v SMITH 9 Utah 2d 139, 340 
P2d 83: "Plaintiff cannot seek to alter a portion of a valid written 
contract ... It would defeat the yery purpose of formal contracts to per-
mit a party to invoke the use of words ... inconsistent with its terms to 
prove that the parties did not mean what they said." Exhibit 1 has been 
abandoned; Exhibit 3 is raised to appurtenance, and it is an incomplete 
instrument. Such result is a "reformation", neyer pleaded nor contended 
for at the trial. This court has held reformation must be pleaded! It 
was not pleaded. It became an afterthought by the court, along with 
"mistake" also not pleaded nor proven. 
Exhibit 1 was the prime document the parties agreed would control. 
There was a deliberation applied to it, absent in the other two which 
not f u l l y conformed! 
were col latera l , /kept but for reference. Yet the unconformed Exhibit 3 
has risen to the prime expression of the parties. Specific enforcement 
of Exhibit 3 would produce poor results. Yet has not this court, as well 
as the court below substituted the incomplete Exhibit 3 for the escrow 
instrument? If this is what the court intends, let is so state so the 
editors of American Law Reports, American Jurisprudence and the rest may 
know where this court stands. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE ARE NO INITIALS BY THE 
ALTERATION. 
The decision states "There are no initials by the changed numeral..." 
The case could make some worthwhile law, helpful to jurisprudence if this 
court would allow that there are initials within from three to five lines 
of the alteration in question. Let this court illuminate this true issue. 
As it is, the decision is a fog. We have searched the cases and find nothing 
worth citing on such placement of initials juxtaposed to an alteration. 
Admittedly it is a "tough", hard decision to find the parties intended 
the initials at lines 24 and 25 were intended to reach to line 21. Burden 
of proof, as assigned to the asserting the affirmative that the change was 
in truth a forgery, and the initials were not intended to reach such change, 
is a convenient way courts solve such problems. A court of equity in an 
equity case has the power to employ conscience. Conscience came off second 
best to inference, at both levels. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING "THE ESCROW AGENT ALLOWED 
APPELLENT TO TAKE HIS COPY OF THE CONTRACT". 
The decision states "The escrow agent allowed the appellant to take 
his copy of the contract on more than one occasion ... he had access to 
the document, and the opportunity to change it." Appellant resents these 
words. They represent prejudice and are capricious for there is no evidence 
the appellant or his counsel even touched Exhibit 1. When this united court 
will allow such language and the inferences incident thereto, there is no 
chance to pursuade on other critical issues. The whole case of respondents 
was built on such thin inferences when under doctrines continuously an-
nounced by this court, the accusers should have produced evidence, clear 
and convincing. In NORTHCREST v WALKER BANK cited at page 45 of our brief 
it is repeated: 
It is true that such acknowledgment and recordation give 
rise to a presumption of the genuiness and the due execution 
and delivery of the deed and is prima facie evidence thereof. 
This presumption should not be regarded lightly but should be 
given great weight. The authorites generally hold that the 
effect of such certificate of acknowledgment will not be over-
thrown upon a mere preponderence of the evidence, but it must 
be clear and convincing. 
If this court does not care to apply such law to the facts of a verified, 
escrowed contract of large money involvement, let it so state, please. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal court compounded the errors of the trial court. In 
terms of rule 76 (e) petition is made for a rehearing for the reasons 
stated herein. Reference is made to appellant's original brief, and 
particularly to points II, III and IV and to the cases cited. Point one 
relates to the evidence. It being conflicting the problems may be solved 
by a proper application to burden of proof being assigned to the respondents 
for they were the prime movers from the default letter to the effort to 
establish their affirmative defense. In this they failed. The trial court 
should still be reversed. The money on deposit awarded to appellant. 
Respectfully, 
» _ ^ 
Warwick C. Lamoreaux, attorney for appellant. 
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